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Hungarian society was among the first in Central and Eastern Europe to try to cut off the political and ideological bounds of the Soviet-type political and economic system. Soon after the 
failure of the 1956 revolution, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 
(Communist Party), launched the policy of gradual reform in the direction 
of the mixed economy: for instance, the growing importance of the second 
economy since the late 1950s, the different waves of decentralization- 
centralization in the state and the co-operative sectors, and finally the in­
troduction of "inside contracting" within the state sector and the policy 
package from the early 1980s aimed at creating small businesses. Together, 
this produced a combination of a mixed economy and a political system 
known as "soft Communism.”1 Due to the cumulative character of the eco­
nomic and political changes, we could notice without surprise the flexibil­
ity and radical pragmatism of the last Communist government, under the 
pressure of the forces of opposition and the changing pattern of super­
power relations. This government officially declared the revolutionary
' These changes could not produce any significant privatization: the share of the 
private sector represented only 3-4 percent of the entire the property structure. 
During the two years following the free election of 1990, 27 percent of all Hungar­
ian state property was privatized.
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character of the 1956 uprising, initiated negotiations about the departure of 
the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary since the end of World War II, de­
molished the "iron curtain" and—within an extremely short period of 
time—introduced a democratic constitution and accepted the multiparty 
system. These political changes culminated during spring 1990, when 
through the free and democratic election the movement towards a West- 
em-style market economy accelerated.
In the following chapters, we shall try to illustrate the main dimensions 
of the creation and the erosion of the monist system of industrial relations 
which functioned in the centrally-planned command economy. During this 
attempt, we shall try to avoid the so-called "label-type" approach and thus 
refrain from using such loaded terms as "Communist" and "post- 
Communist" society.
In the ex-socialist countries, economical and political development did 
not and do not follow a single model of socio-economic development. For 
instance, their current efforts to escape from the failure of the so-called 
"command economy" also vary according to two distinct strategies. One 
group advocates the well-known "shock therapy" (these are the "big- 
bangers")—to a lesser extent, Poland and Russia belong to this category. 
Their opponents, the respective country's group of "gradualists"— 
including Hungary and former Czechoslovakia—prefer step-by-step 
changes which are "less costly economically and more feasible politically" 
("Eastern Europe Hesitates," 1992: 13). At this moment, it is difficult to 
know in advance the socio-political outcome of current changes. These so­
cieties are still in the phase of political and economic transformation. How­
ever, whatever will be the course of events and the pathway followed, it is 
clear that new systems of values, norms and patterns of individual and 
collective behavior are emerging.
M o h is m  B a s e d  o n  t h e  
P o l it ic a l- I d e o l o g ic a l  a n d  E c o n o m ic  M o n o p o l y
After World War II—more exactly from 1949 onwards—a particular 
system of political-ideological and economic monopoly was created in 
Hungary, under the auspices of the Soviet political-ideological influence 
and military presence. The economic monopoly was primarily based on the
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almost-complete nationalization of the industrial, trade and service sectors. 
To illustrate the degree of changes in the country's property structure, it is 
worth noting that, before the Second World War, only ten percent of all 
industrial assets were state-owned (Bakos, 1991). Nation-wide nationaliza­
tion was accompanied by the introduction of branch-oriented economic 
policy and the introduction of centralized ("socialist") planning. The key 
function of socialist planning was to replace the market allocation of re­
sources by the bureaucratic (redistributive) system of regulation. The fol­
lowing table illustrates the degree of centralization in the Hungarian 
manufacturing sector (Komai, 1990).
Table 2.1:Size Distribution of Hungarian Manufacturing Firms (1989)
Hungary Sample o f  
capitalist economies
Average number o f  employees per firm 186 80
Percentage distribution o f  employees by size category (number o f  persons)
10-100 persons 14% 35%
101-500 persons 26% 33%
501-1,000 persons 19% 13%
> 1,000 persons 41% 19%
Source: Komai, 1989.Note: The figures refer to averages of various years in the 1970s. The capitalist economies sam­
pled are Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Sweden.
Centralized planning and the nationalization of property have touched 
not only the industrial and service sectors but also agriculture. Table 2.2 
illustrates the dominance of state ownership in the ex-socialist countries 
compared to the capitalist market economies.
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Table 2.2: Percentage of State and Public Firms in Different Countries 
(their share of production in different years)
Country Percentage
Czechoslovakia 97.0
East Germany 96.5
USSR 96.0
China 73.6
Hungary 65.2
France 16.5
Italy 14.0
West Germany 10.7
Spain 4.1
USA 1.3
Source: Richet, 1990.
The first campaign of collectivization was carried out during the first 
half of the 1950s, with the second one at the end of that decade. As a result 
of these forced campaigns of collectivization and organizational concen­
tration in this sector, the majority of agricultural co-operatives' and state 
farms' activities embraced more than one village. This also means that the 
key political actor in the Hungarian villages was the co-operative president 
and not the local community (government) leader or Party secretary.
The economic monopoly was completed by the political-ideological 
monopoly of the Communist Party. During the 1950s, the traditional part­
ners in industrial relations—government, employers, employees and their 
respective organizations—had the sole obligation to execute the decrees of 
the ruling Communist Party. In this quasi-Orwellian world, the Commu­
nist Party and its leadership tried to develop and maintain an image of the 
omnipotent and ever-reaching power. The following slogan describes this 
approach: "The Party knows everything, is present everywhere and is ca­
pable of doing everything." According to such an ideology, conflicts of in-
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Erosion o f the M onist System (1968- 1988)
Industrial-relations systems, according to the following broad defini­
tion, can be understood as the totality of actors, institutions and procedures 
concerned with determining wages and controlling working conditions 
(substantive rules) and with the structuring of the bargaining process 
(procedural rules). The cumulative character of the political and economic 
changes in Hungarian society have had important impacts on the actors, 
institutions and procedures of that system.
From the beginning of the 1970s, the changing way of life, the visibility 
of conflicts of interests and their dynamic role in society was accepted even 
in Communist Party documents. According to them, socialism "does not 
differ from capitalism in that there are no interest conflicts (in socialism) 
but it does differ in that the class basis of the structural conflicts has come 
to end" (Pozsgai, 1989: 74).
The growing acknowledgment of organizational conflicts and interests 
relations has led to careful measures—at both the national and local (firm) 
level—of co-ordination and representation of interests (Mako, 1990: 186- 
187). Among the important elements of these changes was the develop­
ment of the second economy (economic activities organized outside the 
official economic institutions) from the end of the 1960s onwards. The 
growing economic importance of the second economy became visible from 
the mid-1970s. At the end of this decade, one-third of all household income 
was generated from this source. The role of such economic activities was 
extremely important in agriculture, housing construction and the service 
sector (Gabor et al., 1990). The existence of the second economy generated 
not only extra income, but also enlarged the opportunities for individual 
and collective actions. Thus, an important segment of employees could ful­
fill their needs and learned how to manipulate social relations distinct from 
official industrial-relations institutions.
The informal sector gave a chance for "exit" and "entry" within the first 
economy via this individual—sometimes collective—mobility, which pro­
duced not only financial (economic) but also social benefits for the people 
concerned. The other important step in the liberalization of the Hungarian 
economy before organizational decentralization and privatization, was the 
introduction of the "New Economic Mechanism" in 1968, which was aimed
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terests do not exist; therefore, the autonomous social actors and institutions 
inherent to the interest representation of employees and employers are un­
necessary. This factor, along with other reasons, explains why the autono­
mous institution of industrial relations is missing in the ex-socialist coun­
tries.
If we would like to qualify the nature of the relations among state, em­
ployers and employees, Schmitter's concept of the "monist" model of inter­
est mediation seems to be a suitable category. The monist model is defined 
as "a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into a fixed number of singular, ideologically-selective, non­
competitive, functionally-differentiated and hierarchically-ordered catego­
ries, created, subsidized and licensed by a single party and granted a rep­
resentational role within that party and vis-h-vis the state in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders, articulation of de­
mands and mobilization of support" (Schmitter, 1974).
The industrial-relations partners had the sole obligation to execute the 
party's resolution, as translated into plans and indicators. This autocratic 
arrangement is often called the "Stalinist" variant of the industrial-relations 
system in the centrally-planned command economies (Hethy and Csuhaj, 
1990:10).
In this system of industrial relations, the conflicting interests of different 
socio-occupational groups were suppressed. But in 1956 at a national level, 
and during the 1970s in various forms of illegal strikes ("quota restriction"), 
workers demonstrated both individual and collective forms of resistance 
(Hethy and Makd, 1989: 161-183). The different forms of the "restriction of 
output"—which we could interpret as an "informal voice option" of the 
workers—clearly illustrated that the structural and hierarchical relations of 
the social division of work cannot be "overthrown" through revolution or 
nationalization of property. The differentiation of social relations and con­
sequent ideologies in the labor process can be explained, on the one hand, 
by the social division of labor within the firm; and on the other, by the 
continuous changes taking place in the various components of the wider 
socio-organizational spaces in society.
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at the regularization of the economy using economic tools instead of ad­
ministrative ones.
The following four types of indirect (economic) regulators replaced the 
administrative tools of central planning (Richet, 1989):
1. financial regulations;
2. wage regulations;
3. price regulations; and
4. foreign-trade regulations.
The step-by-step (the so-called "gradualist") "marketization" of the 
Hungarian economy was accompanied by a limited increase in union 
autonomy and a shift in its function. Compared to the union's function 
during the 1950s (the well-known "transmission belt" function), the Hun­
garian unions from 1968 on tried to fulfill a "double-function" to represent 
the interests of their members and to be loyal towards company manage­
ment. In relation to these changes, it is necessary to mention the veto right 
of the unions and, from the mid-1970s, the increased power of shop stew­
ards in the field of working conditions. The high level of participation in 
the second economy and in such organizational innovations as "inside 
contracting" revealed that "in Hungary, very different social groups have 
experiences not only to be adopted to an interventionist, bureaucratic state 
but to the market mechanisms as well, through their social relations which 
opened channels for actions on the basis of reciprocity" (Mak6 and Simo- 
nyi, 1990:15).
C o m p a n y  U n io n  a s  a  T r a n s it io n a l  E u m e n t  o f  t h e  
N e w  In d u s t r ia l -R e ia t io n s  S y s t e m ?
The briefly-described changes in the direction of a mixed economy 
gradually eroded the monist system in Hungary. Within the labor-market 
context of full employment, important socio-professional groups disposed 
a strong, very often informal bargaining positions in relation to the state 
company's management. Employment policy in the former socialist coun­
tries produced a constant labor shortage, in which individual workers have 
an important bargaining position in the form of the "exit option."
The "exit option of adaptation" means that employees or members of 
an organization move from less to more desirable situations to realize their
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interests and ambitions. The other well-known mechanism of adaptation is 
the "voice" option. But only the independent and influential interest repre­
sentation organizations—for instance, unions—could provide the workers 
with a "voice" in the economic system at both a national and a firm level. In 
this sense, "voice" means talking and negotiating about problems, 
"discussing with an employer conditions that ought to be changed rather 
than quitting" (Freeman and Medoff, 1966).
From the late 1960s until the second half of the 1980s, under the circum­
stances for a large segment of the workforce of a "tight labor market," the 
"exit" and "entry" options represented the main forms of individual adap­
tation within the economic system (Dubois and Mako, 1988). This does not 
mean that the well-known "voice" option was completely missing. The 
general weakness and the lack of autonomous union organization for the 
majority of employees did not result in a situation in which all groups of 
workers were "defenseless" against enterprise management. The "core" 
workers gained significant "informal" bargaining power from their specific 
professional knowledge, working ability, monopolistic positions in the la­
bor process and their well-placed position in the political organization. The 
important informal "collective voice" of the core working group in one en­
gineering firm during the early 1970s is well illustrated by the following 
statement of the management shop-floor representative: "These ... men, 
however much they quarrel among themselves, are always in agreement 
seen from outside. They know what they have to do and why, are they ex­
tremely intelligent and very good also at their skill" (Hethy and Mako,
1989). In such cases, union leaders at the firm level formed a coalition of 
interests with state firm's managers in order to avoid central wage control 
and to increase the wages of their members. At the branch level, even the 
minister tacitly supported strike threats or other forms of collective pres­
sure to keep the privilege of his branch or sector during the redistribution 
of the state resources (Herczog and Pal, 1991: 74). From time to time, occu­
pational groups in a strong position in the "worker's state" (for instance, 
miners, steelworkers, metalworkers) have threatened strikes: for example, 
before the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Congress in 1985, to keep 
their privileged position in spite of the economic decline of these produc­
tion sectors (Teller, 1991: 22).
Gradually, the monist system was transformed into a kind of company 
("in-house") unionism. This process is well illustrated by the results of an 
international survey carried out in the middle of the 1980s in the electric
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and electronic industries. The social patterns of company unionism were 
reflected in the employees' opinions collected in the former socialist coun­
tries.2 The data collected in ten countries show that there are no clear dif­
ferences between the capitalist and the ex-socialist countries concerning the 
workers' identity towards the firm. However, a significant difference can 
be noticed in relation to Western European and other countries regarding 
their identity with the firm and the unions. For instance, the identity with 
the firm among the Western European workers (German, Italian, French, 
English, and Swedish workers) means exclusively an identity with the 
company's management; while in the case of the ex-socialist countries (the 
Hungarian, Polish and Yugoslav firms which participated in the survey), 
as well as in Japan and Hong Kong, this identity extends to the whole 
community of the firm, including not only identity with co-workers but 
also with management. The identity with the whole community of the firm 
may be explained in the following way.
Workers' thinking and attitudes towards the different roles of manage­
ment and the unions are not deeply rooted in the class-based interest and 
organizational structure (Ishikawa, 1990). This tendency was reinforced by 
the introduction of the Enterprise-Council system in 1985. This body of 
"quasi-self management" carried out strategic decisions in the large and 
medium-sized state firms. One-half of all enterprise-council members were 
elected directly by the rank-and-file employees; the other half were mem­
bers (ex officio) of management or delegated by the company's director. In 
practice, the enterprise council became the new tool for managerial control 
and accelerated the "deregulation" of the union’s already-weak role in 
long-term business decisions. The short life of the enterprise council had 
strengthened company unionism (M ak6,1987).
The increasing economic and social importance of employee participa­
tion in the second economy, as well as in the activity of "inside contracting" 
within the state firms without union control, had developed the amor­
phous and diffuse social relations among the future partners of the 
autonomous industrial-relations system. Such a constellation of social rela­
tions in any economy facilitates both the development of company union­
ism and non-cooperative union activities. In addition, the growing uncer­
3 In 1985, Denki Roren, the Japanese Trade Union of the Electric and Electronic 
Workers, initiated and financed an international survey on the workers' attitudes 
related to work, firms and union activities.
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tainty in the economic situation—incalculable effects of the recession, rap­
idly-increasing unemployment, privatization and decentralization of the 
economy—altogether diminished the unionization rate and the relative 
power of the unions.
In Hungary, the birth of the independent autonomous union movement 
preceded the free elections and the collapse of the Communist political 
system in the 1990s. To the great surprise of some new union leaders, the 
appearance of independent unions did not produce any clear-cut changes 
in the above-mentioned identity pattern. Instead of a massive support of 
the new, independent unions, there was a development of a segmented 
and rivalry-stricken movement.
E m e r g e n c e  o f t h e  
A u t o n o m o u s  In d u s t r m u - R e u t i o n s  S y s t e m
T h e  I im it e d  L e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  C o d h c i i  i f  In t e r e s t  R e c o n c il i a t i o n
The less visible and less dramatic, but long-term devastating social con­
sequence of the "real-socialism" was the dissolution of civil society and its 
replacement with the illusion of it. By "civil society," we mean institutions 
based on voluntary membership and organized to express the individual 
and collective aspirations and interests of their members. For instance, 
among the constituent elements of any civil society, free trade unions—or 
in a more general sense, autonomous industrial relations—were missing. 
National and international experiences warn us that the management of 
workplace-related conflicts with long-term efficiency is inconceivable with 
the lack of visibility and predictability of relations among the independent 
social actors in economic life. The democratically-elected new Hungarian 
Government—free elections were held between March 25 and April 8, 
1990—has been confronted with numerous urgent economic and social 
problems, such as a huge foreign debt, industrial restructuring, a high in­
flation rate, and rapidly-growing unemployment. Unfortunately, the de­
velopment of the autonomous system of industrial relations has received 
relatively little attention. Political forces in power or in opposition are 
dealing with this social institution in accordance to the shifting constella­
tions of power among them.
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The ambiguous relations of the government and the political parties to 
the unions are well reflected in the functioning of the national-level bar­
gaining institution: the Council for Interest Reconciliation (CIR). In the 
summer of 1990, the activity of CIR was renewed by the new, central-right 
coalition government. This Tripartite Council for Interest Reconciliation 
had been created by the last Communist government in 1988. At that time, 
only the official union (National Council of the Hungarian Unions, SZOT) 
and four employer's organizations were invited to the negotiating table. 
The newly-emerging independent unions (for instance, the Democratic 
League of the Independent Unions) were excluded.
The newly-elected government invited the representatives of all seven 
union confederations and nine employees' organizations. The basic rules 
and regulations of the CIR were adopted in autumn 1991. Its tasks and 
goals are as follows:
I. to deal with the basic economic, wage, social and labor issues pre­
vailing in the work environment;
II. to explore and conciliate the interests and ambitions of employers, 
employees and government in order to prevent incidental conflicts 
and to exchange information of proposals and alternatives; and
III. to provide help in solving conflicts arising in the work environment 
by mediating among the three principle partners. On any partner's 
initiative, it endeavors through negotiation to settle matters on a na­
tional level.
IV. The functions of the CIR are
A. common decisions on issues related to working conditions (for 
instance, minimum wage);
B. consultation on the most important economic, political and stra­
tegic issues, as well as on principles related to the work environ­
ment; and
C. to express its opinion on the most important laws and on other 
forms of regulations concerning labor (Arbitration and Concilia­
tion Advisory Service, 1991).
The new government—elected in spring 1990—did not take the activity 
of the CIR seriously until late autumn 1991. For instance, the representa­
tives of the government in the CIR did not consult their partners about 
such important bills as those on social security, taxation and Enterprise 
Councils until that time. Significant modification in the government posi­
tion towards the social partners of the CIR occurred after the "taxi-drivers'
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blockade" of October 1991. Following two days of hesitation, the govern­
ment was forced by nation-wide social unrest to pay serious attention to 
the participation of employees' and employers' organizations in the work 
of CIR (Lcido and Toth, 1991).
The important and legitimated role of the CIR in the conflict resolution 
of the "taxi-drivers' blockade" demonstrated that the "labor problems be­
come not just unrest, and not just private affairs; rather, they escalate into 
pervasive confrontations, generally violent, which threaten the very demo­
cratic political structure itself" (Inkheles, 1990). But why did the govern­
ment not take the employer's and employee's side within the CIR more se­
riously? What are the sources of rivalry and lack of solidarity among the 
union federations?
D iv id e d  i n i o n s
The new independent unions appeared in the political arena before the 
free national election of 1990. For instance, the Democratic League of the 
Independent Unions (Liga) was created on May 14, 1988. This union had 
significant political credibility due to non-cooperation with the last Com­
munist government. In spite its political legitimacy, Liga did not became 
popular among the mass of employees. Among the political parties, it has 
the support of the leading liberal party in opposition, the Alliance of the 
Free Democrats. The other newly-emerged independent confederation rep­
resents continuity with and nostalgia for the short-lived "Workers Coun­
cils" of the 1956 revolution. Having the same name, this confederation tries 
to combine the wish for self-management and job unionism. From an 
ideological point of view, it represents a mixture of social-democratic, 
Christian values and strong anti-Communism. Its activity is influenced by 
the initially-dominant political party of the first ruling coalition, the Hun­
garian Democratic Forum.
During the process of the emerging of new, independent unions, the so- 
called "old" (or "traditional") unions also underwent important structural 
changes, in accordance with the following principles (H£thy, 1991):
a) neutrality from the political parties; and
b) decentralization and democratization of their internal organiza­
tional structure (creation of the confederation with maximum autonomy 
for member unions).
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As a result of these changes in the union movements, the following 
seven union confederations participate in the activity of the CIR 
(N£pszavya, 1992: 32):
1. National Confederation o f the Hungarian Unions (MSZOSZ): Having 
the strongest bargaining position (approximately 1.7 million members), 
this confederation is very influential in the big firms and the public sector. 
The newly-born independent unions have many conflicts with this confed­
eration, mainly due to disputes about the division of union property. This 
confederation now follows the values of social democracy.
2. Democratic League o f  the Independent Unions (Liga): With approxi­
mately 250,000-300,000 members, this union also tries to represent social- 
democratic values.
3. National Confederation o f the Worker Councils: This confederation has 
approximately 50,000 members.
4. Worker's Solidarity: With approximately 75,000 members, this union 
lacks bargaining skill; hence, its influence at CIR negotiations is weak.
5. Grouping o f  the Intellectual Unions: This union has approximately 
65,000 members.
6. Co-ordinating Forum o f the Unions for Public-Sector Employees: This 
union has approximately 500,000-600,000 members.
7. Autonomous Unions: With approximately 350,000 members, this 
union has played an important mediating role between the MSZOSZ and 
Liga.
Among the seven union confederations, solidarity and common action 
has developed very slowly. In 1991, the relations between the restructured 
"old" union confederation and the new independent unions became so con- 
flictual that the new Parliament issued Act No. XXVIII/1991 aimed at tem­
porarily freezing union assets. Another intervention of Parliament that 
same year was the obligatory renewal of the membership fee (Act No. 
XXIX/1991). Mainly due to the rivalry among the unions, the government 
follows a dualistic strategy in relation to the unions:
A) It invites all existing unions to the bargaining table of the CIR and 
declares the importance of the all industrial-relations system's partners.
B) In the everyday practice of the CIR, it tries to make use of the divi­
sion among the unions. Especially at the beginning, the government ac­
cepted collaboration with the strongest union confederation (MSZOSZ), 
though often questioning its political legitimacy. In its relations with the
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new independent unions, the government's behavior reflected the weak­
ness of its partners.
From the employers' side, nine associations are currently participating 
in the CIR. Their strategy and behavior have been shaped by the forms of 
ownership (public versus private), the size of the firms and their capital. 
Their positions during the debate between government and unions fluctu­
ates according to the dimensions mentioned above. The key factor of their 
"fluctuating behavior" is the dominance of the public property—the state is 
still the largest employer. In the future, in the course of privatization, the 
interests of the different employers' organizations will be more homogene­
ous than at present (Bossanyi, 1991: 51-60).
Coming to the union side of the industrial-relations system, the crisis of 
the Hungarian trade-union movement represents a multidimensional so­
cial and ideological phenomenon:
• Firstly, the political legitimacy crisis is a perverse effect of 40 years 
of autocratic-version state corporatism. This political legitimacy crisis con­
cerns mainly—as has already been mentioned—the largest employee or­
ganization, the National Alliance of the Hungarian Unions (MSZOSZ).
• Secondly, the newly-emerged "independent" unions or other type 
of employee's interest organizations (for instance, Liga or the "Solidarity 
Workers' Alliance") were unable to increase their membership at a signifi­
cant rate.
• Thirdly, the government does not want to continue a serious dia­
logue with these unions. Its approach varies according to the state and 
nature of conflicts among the unions. Finally, we have to mention another, 
in general scarcely-noticed, component of the union crisis. In the Hungar­
ian economy of the 1980s on, we can see an important shift in employment 
structure and production methods. Among other factors, this means the 
growing importance of the service sector, the expansion of non-standard 
employment, the decentralization of the manufacturing sector, and rap­
idly-growing small firms.3 Without the analysis and the evaluation of these 
changes, it would be impossible to produce an appropriate diagnosis and 
policy for the creation of a new industrial-relations system.
3 In 1988, for instance, firms employing a maximum of 20 employees represented 
14.5 percent of all economic organizations in Hungary. By 1990, the number of 
firms o f the same size reached 55.9 percent.
saa}UBJBnS u iB jjaa  sap np u i qDiqM ju a u ia a jS B  aAipajjoD,, pajjBa-os b aaaSap 
jB a jS  Xub oj ip B a j UB3 suoiun p a jB d sjd -jp M  puB jubjijtui m s j b Xju o
• jB ss iu is ip  jB i ju s jo d  j o  p S j b }  a q j  
a u iB a a q  p B X ju o a  a q j  u S i s  jo u  p ip  o q M  s a a X o jd u ia  a q i  s jD B i ju o a  ^ jo m  jB n  
-p iA ip u i  S u r x i a ja jd  ju a m a S B U B U i s j i  's u o iu n  a q i  q jiM  ju a u i a a jS e  a A p a a jjo a  
b  a^ B U i j o u  p i p  ja u M O  M a u  a q x  u l i i j  U B U js n y  u b  X q  jq S n o q  sb m  X u B d u io a  
8 u ip [ in q -p B O J  j jB q d s B  jB u o i S a j  a q j  'X ju n o a  U B iJ B S u n n  a u o  u i 'a a u B js u i  j o j  
• a u io q  jb  p a p a d s a i  s p jB p u B js  jB ju a u iu o i iA u a  a q j  X jd d B  X a q j o p  j o u  ' ja u j J B d  
jB ia o s  b  s b  X js n o i ja s  s u o iu n  a ^ B j jo u  o p  X j ju a n b a j j  X a q x  X j ju n o a  a u io q  
J i a q j  u i  p a s n  p u s  p a jd a a a B  Jo iA B q a q  u i j i j  j o  a p o a  j s a i q ja  a q j  X jd d B  jo u  
o p — s u o iu n  S u o j j s  j o  a S B ju a q  u m o  J i a q j  aA B q  q a iq M — s a u ju n o a  j s i jb j
- id B a  p a d o p A a p  a q j  j o  s a iu B d u io a  jB i io i jE U i j jn u i  a q j  u a A a  'X jB S u n H  u j
i£Z
:Z661 Is jo g  puB jp s )  suoiun a[ijojd-Moi ajo jajaqj pus papiAip '5JB3M aq} 
sssdXq oj sauj '( y js )  XauaSy X jjad o jj 3jBj§ aqi 'sssaojd uoijBzijBAud aq; 
jo  uoijnjijsui Xa  ^ aqj 'suoijnjijsui juauiuisAoS J3qjo a^iq -jaAa[ u ijij puB 
jbuoijbu aq? ib qjoq ajoi Sinqsiuiunp b SuiXBjd mou 3jb suoiun uBusSunH 
aqj 'uoijBzijBAud aqj jo  sjunoaaB Xjjb3 3qj oj Suipjoaay juauisAoui uoiun 
-3pBJj 9ui8j3ui3 aqj jo j s3au3nb3suoa jBiaos Suiuubjb sji pus ssaupspis-suo 
IBaiSojoapi 3AoqB 3qj sjjoddns 'ui3jsXs aiiuouoaa puB jeai}ijod jsqBpos aq; 
jo  3sdBjjoa jBaijijod 0661 aM? Suimojjoj uoijBzijBAud jo  aaususdxd aqj,
•(1661
'jsiABx) „sjn3jaas sjnsisn jd  suBp aqajBUi np aaqaa ajqissod np asXjBuej 
 ^ aaBjd ap nad assiBj 'aauBpuoqB.j 'afla.p s j3a bjj  ^ ja  aqajBUi ap aiuiouoa^.j 
ajpuiajjB jauuad uoijBSijBAud 3jn3s B{ snb sdubXojd bj :sja8uep suiBjjaa 
ap j3 ju 3s?jd  subs SBd JS3,u auisijBj^qq ay jnod  ju3uin8jB juap?a?jd 
jiOAnod aj JBd aaB^d ua sasiui sanbiuiouoa^ suoijn;ijsui sa| sajno} 
ap juauiapidBJ jassBisqap as  ^ juaqajaqa mb saAijBAjasuoa no sajBjaqij 
sajiiofeui sajpAnou ap JiOAnod nB ^uauiB juo sanbpijod sjuauiaSuBqD 
saj„ :sA\ofjoj sb Xuiouoaa uBiJBSunH aqi uo jiadxa ub Xq passaid 
-xa XpixuB aqj aasqs am  'aSuBqa }Bqj oj uoi)B|aj uj diqsiauMO ajBAud 
jo  XaBuiaidns aqj uo pasBq XSojoapi aAijBAjasuoa-jBjaqii b jo uoipaiip aqj 
ur (uisijBJodioa ajBjs jo  uoisjaA axjBjaojnB aqj jo j asBq juBiiodun ub) XSojo 
-api pixjBp^ aiuouiaSaq u io jj ^jiqs {BDipBJ b aAiasqo usa aM 'sXbpbm o^
AUV9N0H HI N U S A S  SNOIlVl]||-lVllllSiaN|
3 H 1 II SiOldSOVd 3unmj
6C ^ U l S I U O I U f )  p s p i A I Q  OJ U l S | U O | V  U I O J J
40 Csaba Mako
concerning employment, wages and other working conditions. According 
to these circumstances, the unions are likely to revise their political neu­
trality and develop alliances with political forces. For instance, in spring 
1992, the largest trade-union confederation (MSZOSZ) revised and decided 
to give up its political strategy "to keep the same distance from each politi­
cal force." Both pressure from the government and its unpredictable be­
havior forced them during the election to support candidates from the 
Hungarian Socialist Party. This was the only party in opposition which did 
not vote in Parliament the previous summer to freeze union assets. During 
the 1992 Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the president declared 
his party's eagerness to form "an election alliance with the unions belong­
ing to the National Confederation of the Hungarian Unions" (K£ri and G31, 
1992: 4).
Following the decision by the Constitutional Court, the majority of the 
trade-union confederations (six out of seven) achieved an agreement in 
May 1992 concerning union elections (according to the legal terms of Act 
XXVIII/1991) as well as works-council (Uzemi Tanacs) elections (as set 
down in the New Labor Code, Act XXII/1992).
The results of this election mainly contributed to the settlement of con­
flicts and rivalry resulting from the legitimacy issues between the new and 
renewed trade-union confederations. During the national elections for trus­
tees of the Pension Fund and Health Fund—organized on May 21,1993—at 
least two important social facts were noticeable. First, the rate of participa­
tion in the elections was much higher than during the elections of politi­
cians either into Parliament or into local administrative self-governance 
bodies. In the case of the trustees for the Health Fund, 39 percent of the 
total voting population voted in the election; and in the case of the trustee 
for the Pension Fund, 50.1 percent participated. The other surprising fact 
was that the so-called "renewed trade-union confederation" (MSZOSZ) 
received the majority of the votes and in the future was therefore able to 
play an extremely important role in these organizations, the importance of 
which—according to international experience— is growing.
According to preliminary data regarding firm-level works-council elec­
tions, the National Confederation of Hungarian Unions (MSZOSZ) won 
more than 60 percent of the votes. The results of the national and firm-level 
union elections ended the legitimacy and representativity debate among 
the different union confederations. The works-council elections held in 
summer 1995 produced the same result as in 1993.
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The need for innovative solutions in the field of the Hungarian indus­
trial-relations system could be satisfied by using the various national expe­
riences revealed in international perspectives (Kasvio, Makd and McDaid,
1990). The current process of European integration creates both challenges 
and opportunities for the renewal of industrial relations in the ex-socialist 
countries. By implementing new political and economic systems in these 
countries, we should learn from each other's successes and failures. Such 
"collective learning," and the co-operation based on it, could play an im­
portant role in mutual understanding and co-reaction in the new European 
social institutions.
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